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Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v.
United States: A Retreat from Full First
Amendment Protection for Commercial
Speech

In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States,' the
United States Supreme Court considered whether 18 U.S.C. § 1304,2
which prohibits the broadcast of gambling advertisements, violated First
Amendment protection of commercial speech-speech related only to the
speaker's and the audience's economic interests-when applied to
broadcast advertisements within states that have legalized casino
gambling. Many critics expected, and perhaps hoped, the Supreme
Court would seize this opportunity to discard, or at least drastically
modify, the Central Hudson4 balancing test that the Court has used in
commercial speech cases for almost twenty years.5 The Court refused
to do so,6 however, leaving the appropriate application of the test open
to as much confusion as before. Still, the Court continued its trend of

119 S. Ct. 1923 (1999).
The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio or television station for which a
license is required by any law of the United States, or whoever ... knowingly
permits the broadcasting of, any advertisement of or information concerning any
lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or
in part upon lot or chance ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994)
3. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
4. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
5. See Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not 'Low Value" Speech, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 85
(1999) (calling for equal protection of commercial speech); Sean P. Costello, Comment,
Strange Brew: The State of Commercial Speech Jurisprudence Before and After 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681 (1997) (predicting the end
of the CentralHudson test); Michael W. Field, Note, On Tap, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island: Last Call for the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 57
(1996) (same).
6. 119 S. Ct. at 1930.
1.
2.

945
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extending protection to commercial speech by holding the statute
violated First Amendment commercial speech protection as applied to
the facts of this case.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

First enacted as Section 316 of the Communications Act of 1934,8
Section 1304 has been expanded through the years to include television
as well as radio broadcasting in its ban. Although this is a criminal
statute with both criminal fines and penalties, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has traditionally enforced the statute through
administrative sanctions.9
Petitioners were an association of FCC-licensed Louisiana broadcasters
who would have allowed advertisements of privately owned, for-profit
casinos. They conceded that the language of Section 1304 bans
advertising of gaming facilities, even in states like Louisiana that have
legalized gambling. Supreme Court precedent and FCC interpretation
supported this view. Petitioners, however, attacked the statute on the
ground that it violated the First Amendment as it applied to commercial
speech. They sought an injunction to prevent enforcement of the statute
against them."1

The district court applied the Central Hudson four-prong test for
assessing commercial speech restrictions and granted summary
judgment in favor of the Government. The court noted that the
statutory restrictions furthered the government's interests in protecting
states without legalized gaming casinos and in reducing the social costs
associated with gambling. Although divided, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed, reasoning that gambling is a "vice activity" and that
the advertising of casinos can claim no greater constitutional protection
than can the gambling itself. But the dissent pointed out the many
recognized exceptions to Section 1304, thus calling into question the
governmental interests ostensibly being advanced. Petitioners then
sought certiorari.11
While that petition was pending, the Supreme Court in 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island 2 decided that Rhode Island's statutes prohibiting
the advertisement of liquor prices violated the First Amendment's

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 1936.
48 Stat. 1064, 1088.
119 S. Ct. at 1927, 1928.
Id. at 1928-29.
Id. at 1929.
517 U.S. 484 (1996).
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protection of commercial speech.13
In 44 Liquormart the Court
determined that the CentralHudson test must be applied with "special
care" when a government regulation places a complete ban on commercial speech, although the Justices were divided as to exactly what that
meant when applying the third and fourth prongs of the CentralHudson
test. 4 In light of this decision, the Supreme Court vacated the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting and remanded
the case.' 5
Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Valley Broadcasting
Co. v. United States 6 decided that Section 1304 violated the First
Amendment's protection of commercial speech as applied to privately
operated casinos in Nevada. 7 Yet the Fifth Circuit in Greater New
OrleansBroadcastingfound for the Government, though it acknowledged
that prong four of the CentralHudson test had become more difficult to
meet.'" As a result of the inconsistent application of the Central
Hudson test, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to petitioners in
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting. The Court reversed the Fifth
Circuit's decision, holding that under the original Central Hudson test,
Section 1304 violates the First Amendment's protection of commercial
speech when applied to advertisements of privately operated casinos
broadcast by stations located in states where casino gambling is legal.2"
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, the
United States Supreme Court extended First Amendment protection to
a form of commercial speech that had been statutorily banned for almost
sixty-five years.2 ' In doing so, the Court attempted to clear up the
confusion surrounding the application of the Central Hudson test, and
it further weakened a statute already riddled with exemptions, calling
into question the governmental policy supporting the statute.22
As early as 1827, Congress had enacted laws aimed at preventing
lottery advertisements or tickets from passing through the United States

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 516 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 504.
119 S. Ct. at 1929.
107 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1336.
119 S. Ct. at 1929.
Id. at 1930.
Id. at 1936.
Id.
Id. at 1930.
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mails.' Subsequent laws also restricted the dissemination through the
mails of newspapers containing lottery information.24 These laws are
now codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303. The Supreme Court justified
these restrictions in Ex ParteJackson:25
All that Congress meant by... [the Act of March 3, 1873] was, that
the mail should not be used to transport such [obscene, lewd, or
lascivious] corrupting publications and articles, and that any one who
attempted to use it for that purpose should be punished. The same
inhibition has been extended to circulars concerning lotteries,-institutions which are supposed to have a demoralizing influence
upon the people.2"
This "demoralizing influence" rationale has been the foundation of most
defenses of the antilottery statutes.
When technology advanced to broadcasting capabilities, Congress
extended its lottery restrictions to this medium through Section 316 of
the Communications Act of 1934, which is now codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1304.27 Through the years, Congress has added language to this
statute to encompass television broadcasting in the ban; otherwise, they
have made only minor changes in phraseology. Nonetheless, the broad
language of the statute has been understood to ban not only lottery
advertisements, but also advertisements of any enterprise involving
chance, from local contests to gaming casinos.28
In 1950 Congress first narrowed the scope of Section 1304 when it
exempted advertisements of nonprofit fishing contests, noting that these
qualified as "'innocent pastimes ... far removed from the reprehensible
type of gambling activity which it was paramount in the congressional
mind to forbid.'" 29 Then, in 1975 Congress exempted state-run lotteries
from the reach of Section 1304, so long as they were advertised only in
states that allowed lotteries.30 In 1988 Congress likewise exempted
tribal casinos from the ban through passage of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act ("IGRA), 31 which authorizes tribes to broadcast
advertisements of their casinos even in states that have not legalized

23. See Act of Mar. 2, 1827, § 6, 4 Stat. 238, 238 (1860).
24. See, e.g., Anti-Lottery Act of 1890, § 1, 26 Stat. 465, 465.
25. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).

26.
27.
28.
29.
3011).
30.

Id. at 736.
119 S. Ct. at 1927.
Id.
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 2243, at 2 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3010,
18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1994).

31. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
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gambling.3 2 That same year, through the Charity Games Advertising
Clarification Act of 1988, Congress also extended the exemption of
Section 1304 to include not only state-run lotteries, but also any gaming
activity conducted by any government, nonprofit, or commercial
organization, so long as the commercial organization was only conducting a promotional activity "clearly occasional and ancillary to ... [its]
primary business.
All these congressionally approved exemptions
severely limited the reach of Section 1304's ban on gambling advertising.
At the same time, the courts were also limiting the reach of other
regulatory statutes like Section 1304 by extending First Amendment
protection of commercial speech. Historically, commercial speech has
received less protection under the First Amendment than other forms of
speech. In 1942, for example, the Court held in Valentine v. Chrestensen 4 that an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of handbills in a
street was a constitutional ban on speech. 35 The Court wrote,
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places
for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and
disseminating opinion and that, though the states and municipalities
may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they
may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public
thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no
such restrainton government as respects purely commercial advertising.36

Nonetheless, as the Court pointed out in Central Hudson, the First
Amendment affords commercial speech protection from unwarranted
governmental regulation because commercial speech communicates
accurate, even if incomplete, information.37 Speech that informs the
public is entitled to at least some protection.3" Still, the government
may regulate commercial speech so long as the limited First Amendment
protections are not offended.39
In Central Hudson the Court explored the issue of when commercial
speech is entitled to this constitutional protection. Central Hudson, a
New York electrical utility company, wanted to advertise and thus
promote electricity consumption, but New York's Public Service

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

119 S.Ct. at 1928.
18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2)(B).
316 U.S. 52 (1942).
Id. at 55.
Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
447 U.S. at 561-63.
Id. at 562-63.
Id. at 563.
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Commission issued a regulation that prohibited Central Hudson from
any promotional advertising."' In deciding whether this prohibition
violated the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech, the
Court established a four-part balancing test to be employed in commercial speech cases:
[1) At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not
be misleading. [2] Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine [3] whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and [4] whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
The Court then found that although the first three prongs of the test
were satisfied, the fourth was not because the regulation banned
information about devices and services that would not affect energy
consumption.42 Therefore, the Court held the regulation violated the
First Amendment because it was more extensive than necessary.43
In 1986, however, the Supreme Court seemingly retreated from its
trend of granting First Amendment protection to commercial speech
when it held in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of
Puerto Rico' that a statute prohibiting advertisements of gambling to
Puerto Rican citizens was not unconstitutionally vague.45 In reaching
this controversial decision, the Court gave great deference to the
government's interest in protecting its citizens from the evils that
purportedly accompany gambling, while desiring to protect tourism for
economic reasons. 46 The Court gave little attention to the "fit" between
the ends and the means of the statute.47 This approach differed from
the Court's previous "no more extensive than necessary" standard,'
and led to confusion concerning how the Central Hudson test would be
applied.

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 558-59.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 572.

44. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 347-48.
at 341.
at 341-42.
at 352.
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It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court in United States
v. Edge Broadcasting CO. 49 decided that regulation of the broadcast of
Virginia lottery information by a radio station licensed and located in
North Carolina, a nonlottery state, did not violate the First Amendment
as it applies to commercial speech.50 Using the Central Hudson test,
the Court determined that the lottery advertisement was unprotected
commercial speech."' The Court focused on prong three of the Central
Hudson test-the relationship between the government's substantial
interest in balancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery states and
the regulation employed to advance it.52 The Court determined that
the ban of lottery information on all North Carolina stations, even those
located near the Virginia border, was not ineffective because, otherwise,
the increase in listening time with lottery advertisements would not be
without significance.' Thus, because listeners would be subjected to
less lottery advertising, the prohibition was justified."
Just three years later, however, the Court in 44 Liquormart, in a
severely fractured opinion, strengthened commercial speech protection
when it overruled the approach taken in Posadasand decided a state's
complete ban on nonmisleading speech concerning a legal product must
be reviewed more carefully under the Central Hudson test.55 Two
liquor retailers, one from Rhode Island and one from Massachusetts,
challenged Rhode Island's laws that banned advertisements of liquor
prices except at the place of sale." Because the restriction was a
blanket prohibition on the liquor retailers' commercial speech, the Court
determined the Central Hudson test must be applied with "special
care."5 7 Yet the Court noted that the regulation in question did not
satisfy even the less stringent, normal application of the CentralHudson
test." The Justices could not agree, though, on whether the restriction
directly advanced the government's interest (prong three) or whether it
was more extensive than necessary (prong four).59 Regardless, the
stage was set for confusion over how the CentralHudson test should be
applied-using a strict or intermediate level of scrutiny.

49. 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (5-4 decision).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 423-24, 436.
at 436.
at 427-29.
at 432-33.
at 432.

55. 517 U.S. at 501, 509-10.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 492.
at 504.
at 507.
at 488-89.
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In 1997 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Valley BroadcastingCo.
v. United States' held that Section 1304 violated the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech when applied to the broadcasting
of privately owned casino advertisements within Nevada."l In reaching
this conclusion, the court refused to apply strict scrutiny, as many
believed 44 Liquormart demanded. 2 Instead, the court found the
government's interests, (1) reducing the social costs associated with the
ills of gambling and (2) "'assist[ing] states that prohibit casino gambling
... by regulating interstate activities such as broadcasting that are
beyond the powers of the individual states to regulate,'" did not satisfy
the original Central Hudson test, which called for only intermediate
scrutiny.6
Soon afterwards, the Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting and remanded for
consideration in light of 44 Liquormart.6" On remand, the Fifth Circuit
expressed its dissatisfaction with the unclear standard for the application of the Central Hudson test." Then, after reconsidering the case,
the court conceded that the directive of 44 Liquormart made meeting
prong four of the CentralHudson test more difficult for the Government,
but held that the Government had nonetheless satisfied that higher
standard.6 The dissent then asserted that whether Central Hudson
was applied more strictly or not, the statute still violated the First
Amendment. 7

60.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

107 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1997).

Id. at 1336.
Id. at 1331-32.
Id. at 1336.
119 S. Ct. at 1929.
149 F.3d 334, 335 (5th Cir. 1998). The court protested,
What seemed a fairly straightforward analysis when this panel first considered
the constitutionality of the federal statute prohibiting the broadcast of radio and
television advertisements for casino gambling, 18 U.S.C. § 1304, has dissolved into
a welter of confusion following 44 Liquormart. On one hand, in 1993, the
Supreme Court upheld a companion provision that bans some broadcast
advertising of state-sponsored lotteries ....
On the other hand, after 44
Liquormartwas decided, the Ninth Circuit felt obliged to hold unconstitutional the
provision at issue in this case, which bans radio and television advertisements for
privately-run casino gambling. Has Edge lost its edge in the succeeding five
years? Or on the contrary, has the rule of Edge, become a constitutional mandate?
Such that Congress can now ban broadcast advertisements for gambling only in
states that prohibit such gambling? Finally, has the Supreme Court gone over the
edge in constitutionalizing speech protection for socially harmful activities?
Id. (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 340.
67. Id. at 341.

2000]

GREATER NEW ORLEANS

III.

953

THE COURT'S RATIONALE

Because of widespread criticism and confusion regarding the application of the Central Hudson test, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in GreaterNew Orleans Broadcasting, hoping to clarify its position.6
Critics argued that the test had proven too open to the subjective
interpretation of judges, especially in the lower courts.69 Therefore,
many hoped the Court would establish a new, clearer standard with
which to assess commercial speech.7 ° But the Court refused to "break
new ground" by repudiating Central Hudson in favor of a more
"straightforward and stringent" test and concluded that CentralHudson,
as applied in recent cases, served to resolve the issue in Greater New
71
Orleans Broadcasting.
The most recent case of note was the splintered decision in 44
Liquormart, which purported to adopt a stricter standard of review for
commercial speech regulations, even though the regulation in question
72
did not meet the more lenient standard of intermediate scrutiny.
However, in GreaterNew OrleansBroadcastingthe Court failed to reach
a consensus concerning exactly how to afford commercial speech greater
protection, retreating from its more liberal assertions in 44 Liquormart. 73
Thus, the Court ostensibly returned to the intermediate
scrutiny originally established in Central Hudson.74
The Government was able to satisfy prongs one and two of the Central
75
The Court
Hudson test in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting.
ultimately held, however, that Section 1304 violated prongs three and
four as applied to petitioners because the government's interests were
not directly advanced by the overly extensive regulation.76 First, the
Court noted that the regulation in question obviously involved truthful,

68. 119 S. Ct. at 1930.
69. See, e.g., Troy, supra note 5, at 134; Valerie D. Wood, Comment, The Precarious
Position of Commercial Speech: Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLy
612,612-13 (1996); Andrew S. Gollin, Comment, Improving the Odds of the Central Hudson
Balancing Test: Restricting Commercial Speech as a Last Resort, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 873,

876 (1998).
70. See Gollin, supra note 69, at 877-78; Brian J. Waters, Comment, A Doctrine in
Disarray: Why the FirstAmendment DemandsAbandonment of the Central Hudson Test
for Commercial Speech, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1626, 1645-56 (1997).
71. 119 S. Ct. at 1930.
72. 517 U.S. at 507.
73. 119 S.Ct. at 1930.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1930-32.
76. Id. at 1932.
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nonmisleading speech about a legal activity.77 Second, the Court
acknowledged that the government's interests, "(1) reducing the social
costs associated with 'gambling'" and (2) assisting states that restrict or
prohibit gambling within their borders, were substantial, though it
indicated that "that conclusion is by no means self-evident."" Nevertheless, the Court withheld its attack on the constitutionality of Section
1304 until it applied prongs three and four.79
Under prong three the Court found that a ban on advertising did not
directly advance the government's interests."0 As for its first asserted
interest-alleviating the societal ills associated with gambling-the
Government argued a ban on promotional advertising would decrease
the demand for gambling and its social costs."1 Also, the Government
argued that banning gambling advertisements would prevent compulsive
gamblers from being lured to casinos.8 2 The Court, however, found
fault with these arguments for three reasons. First, although the
demand for gambling might increase if casino advertising were allowed,
the advertising really only served to encourage patrons to choose one
casino over another.8 3 Second, Congress's encouragement of tribal
casino gambling had resulted in that industry's growth at a rate that
84
privately owned casinos could not match through advertising alone.
Third, the Court found the myriad of exemptions to Section 1304 had
undermined the purposes and policies behind the statute. 5
Similarly, the government's second interest-helping to discourage
gambling on the state level--could not hope to be achieved if the

77. Id. at 1930.
78. Id. at 1931. The Court explained,
[T]he social costs that support the suppression of gambling are offset, and
sometimes outweighed, by countervailing policy considerations, primarily in the
form of economic benefits .... Congress has not only sanctioned casino gambling
for Indian tribes through tribal-state compacts, but has enacted other statutes
that reflect approval of state legislation that authorizes a host of public and
private gambling activities .... Whatever its character in 1934 when § 1304 was
adopted, the federal policy of discouraging gambling in general, and casino
gambling in particular, is now decidedly equivocal.
Id. at 1931-32 (citations and footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 1932.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1932-33.
84. Id. at 1933.
85. Id. After all, government-sponsored gambling in the form of lotteries arguably is
as demoralizing as other forms of gambling.
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government could not discourage gambling on the federal level."6
Besides, the amount of truthful information about legal activities
sacrificed to Section 1304 was intolerable. 7 Additionally, even if
broadcasts from Louisiana could be heard in Arkansas and Texas, which
do not allow privately operated casinos, the government had defeated its
own objective of protecting those consumers because Congress's
exceptions to Section 1304 already permitted tribal casinos and certain
lotteries to advertise in those states.8 8
As for prong four, the Court also found Section 1304 to be more
extensive than necessary.8 9 Although the Court reiterated its position
that the government need not adopt the least restrictive means available
to achieve its interests, the Court called for a narrow tailoring of the
regulation to the interests. 90 Under Section 1304 broadcasters from
every state were prohibited from carrying advertisements for privately
operated casinos, regardless of whether the state had legalized gambling.9 This restriction reached much further than was necessary,
especially considering that IGRA exempts advertisements for tribal
casinos from the prohibition in any state.9 2 While the government
might have sound reasons for protecting Native American businesses
through regulation of competing non-Native American businesses, the
Court pointed out this goal could be achieved by means other than
regulating the competitors' speech.9 3 Likewise, regulation of privately
operated casinos could be achieved through various other means of
regulation that do not interfere with speech and First Amendment
protections."
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas concurred separately in
the opinion, though both argued for a stricter standard of protection for
commercial speech. The Chief Justice focused on the least restrictive
means approach to prong four.9" He postulated that if Congress were
to regulate the gambling industry itself, the multiple exemptions to
Section 1304 might be tolerable.9
But when Congress chooses to
regulate only commercial speech, the Chief Justice agreed the Central

86. Id. at 1935.

87. Id.
88. Id.

89. Id. at 1932-33.
90. Id. at 1934.

91. Id. at 1933.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 1933-34.
Id. at 1934.
Id.
Id. at 1936 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Id.
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Hudson test called for a more demanding standard of statutory
review.97 Justice Thomas, on the other hand, held firm to his belief
that any interest in curtailing truthful, nonmisleading commercial
speech is "'per se illegitimate'" and could justify regulation of neither
commercial nor noncommercial speech, a belief he expressed in 44
Liquormart." Justice Thomas stated that the Central Hudson test
should not have been applied in this case because the government
wanted to keep people ignorant of a legal product and thereby manipulate their choices as consumers.99
IV. IMPLICATIONS

In GreaterNew Orleans Broadcastingthe Supreme Court ignored a
prime opportunity to clarify its approach to commercial speech protection. The Court could have reqiuired strict scrutiny, thus granting
commercial speech the same First Amendment protection as noncommercial speech. Using strict scrutiny the Court could have discarded the
inconsistent Central Hudson balancing test and adopted a least
restrictive means approach. This method would be more easily and
consistently applied by the lower courts and would offer a degree of
stability and certainty to an uncertain area of law.
The Court's refusal to do so, however, does not necessarily indicate a
more conservative attitude toward commercial speech protection. In a
time of national economic prosperity, the Court is unlikely to uphold
restrictions on advertising, which is a key tool in achieving that
prosperity."° Instead, by reaffirming the Central Hudson test, the
Court has chosen to avoid the turmoil that resulted in 44 Liquormart
when the Justices could not agree on a test to replace CentralHudson.
In practice, though, the Court may merely have resorted to employing
more creative means of finding impermissibility within the Central
Hudson framework. After all, the test lends itself to subjective
manipulation, and the Supreme Court, in cases since Posadasand Edge,
has made clear its trend of liberally extending commercial speech protection.1 01

97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
See R. George Wright, Freedomand Culture: Why We Should Not Buy Commercial

Speech, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 137 (1994) (advocating less protection of commercial speech
on the ground that consumerism is not a true indication of prosperity).
101. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 763 (1993) (holding that Florida's ban

on in-person business solicitation by certified public accountants was unconstitutional);

Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490-91 (1995) (holding that the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act's ban on the display of alcohol content on beer labels was unconstitutional); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
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Eventually, the Court will have to reformulate its approach.
Continued manipulation of the CentralHudson test will cause further
confusion and evoke additional criticism. Thus, the Court will be forced
to extend equal protection to commercial speech outright. Otherwise, it
will have to find a mutually agreeable, yet still more openly liberal,
alternative.
FRANCES CLAY

